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T H E PROSPECT IN EUROPE 
By G E O R G E P. A U L D 
of Haskins and Sells 
Former Accountant-General of the Reparation Commission; 
Author of "The Dawes Plan and the New Economics." 
The program assigns me a subject of fascinating vagueness, but 
my real topic is the reparation and inter-ally debt question, with par-
ticular reference to the so-called transfer problem. 
It is nearly four years since the Dawes plan ushered in a real 
peace and made possible the resumption of normal processes of pro-
duction and trade. Within that period, there has been a striking 
improvement in European conditions. But the time has been too 
short for any such substantial and permanent improvement to have 
occurred as would warrant the idea that the plan has completed its 
service to mankind. Its continued successful operation remains a 
matter of vital consequence to the political and economic stability of 
Europe, and thus, as one does not need to emphasize in this com-
pany, of large immediate importance to us in America. 
The inter-ally debt settlements have an importance of a different 
kind. Except in the case of England, the period of large instalment 
payments has not yet arrived and the question of their direct economic 
effects is still one of the future. The settlements have, however, a 
large present significance in the influence which they exert on the 
reparation question. Simplifications of the machinery of the Dawes 
plan are now being suggested, having as desirable features the definite 
fixation of the German liability and the commercialization of the debt 
through the sale of reparation bonds to the world investing public 
for the benefit of the allies. But these suggestions are invariably 
linked with a proposal that Germany's obligation be fixed at a 
figure considerably lower than the estimated value of the present 
annuities, and a serious stumbling block immediately appears in the 
debts owed by the allies to this country. So long as those obliga-
tions in their present magnitude hang over the allies, it does not seem 
likely that we shall see any important revision of the plan involving 
further concessions to Germany. 
Nor, in my view, is further concession by the allies necessary, 
either equitably or from an economic standpoint. The burdens rest-
ing on the allies are no less than those on Germany; and the idea 
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that the reparation debt (or the inter-ally debts) must be reduced 
because of difficulties to be encountered in transferring payments 
across frontiers is without substantiation. 
The record of the Dawes plan to date is one of unqualified success. 
Its prospects, fundamentally, are of the best. It is powerfully sup-
ported by public opinion, which, as we all know, is today much better 
informed and far more potent in international affairs than ever be-
fore in history. Public opinion is reasonably clear, and properly so, 
that the burden placed on Germany by the Dawes plan is an equitable 
one, that it is not based on the idea of revenge and that it has no 
reference to the tangled question of responsibility for the war. The 
burden is laid in the interest of a fair distribution of the war losses 
among all the nations of Europe, no one of which could undertake 
to carry a disproportionate load without involving all of them in the 
common danger of collapse. The French are pinning their hopes of 
rehabilitation to the Dawes plan; and the Germans, under the intel-
ligent leadership of men like Marx, Stresemann and Luther, are 
able to recognize the benefits of political stability and economic re-
construction which the plan confers on Germany itself. 
The Dawes plan is morally well grounded; and it was an ad-
vantageous settlement for all concerned. A t bottom, therefore, it 
is sound and vigorous. We are told, however, by a school of 
English economists, that the plan is impractical. It works, but 
the Keynes school tells us that it cannot continue to work when 
the period of maximum payments arrives this fall. It is a fair 
and advantageous arrangement, drawn up, accepted and supported by 
reasonable and intelligent men. But the economists tell us that 
there is an economic law with which a settlement of such a charac-
ter is in conflict, and which will compel the plan to give up the 
ghost. They tell us of a new economic something recently 
come into the laws of international exchange, called the transfer 
problem, which prevents a willing and solvent debtor from paying 
or a willing and needy creditor from receiving, without harm to 
himself, the installments on any international debt as large as the 
reparation debt. 
This so-called transfer problem has been made the basis of 
repeated warnings to the French that they must reduce their rep-
aration claims. The annuities provided under the Dawes plan I 
estimate have a capitalized value of nine billion dollars. Roughly 
half of the obligation runs to France. The French need the relief 
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which it represents. Their struggle for fiscal and economic regen-
eration is scarcely yet out of its initial chapter, and they are wholly 
unreconciled to the idea of a stoppage of reparation payments. 
They take no stock in the transfer problem. They are deeply im-
pressed by the view that if reparation payments should be sus-
pended by the Transfer Committee, such action would occur not 
as a consequence of any inherent economic difficulty, but as a 
result of this very transfer agitation itself. 
There can be no doubt that the predictions of a breakdown, 
unsubstantial though they are intrinsically, would tend, if given 
credence, to bring about that very catastrophe, just as the spread 
of unfounded rumors in the street has been known to cause a dis-
astrous run on the deposits of a bank. There is a close similarity 
between the two cases. For the Dawes plan functions in a very 
real and definite sense as a part of the world credit system. Its 
operation today depends on the American investor. It is the dollar 
exchange being made available to Germany through American loans 
which furnishes the means of transferring the payments out of Ger-
many. This process, at the present stage of the reconstruction of 
Europe, is a wholly natural and healthy one for all concerned, and 
in normal conditions it seems due to go on for a long time to come. 
But the Keynes school is determined that the American investor shall 
believe it to be a dangerous and unnatural process. If the investor 
should take these ideas seriously and stop loaning our surplus capital 
to Europe, the result undoubtedly would be a political and commercial 
crisis of considerable proportions, affecting this country, as well as 
Europe. The discoverers of the transfer problem are playing with 
forces of a highly explosive nature, both economic and political, and 
their ideas ought to be clearly recognized and tagged for what they 
are, a body of doctrinaire theory possessing no solid foundation. 
These theories have had a considerable success with the man in 
the street. Under their influence former standards of judgment re-
garding the creation and payment of debts have become dowdy and 
old-fashioned. Those old standards, possessed of a certain funda-
mental simplicity and tested by long experience, regarded taxable 
capacity as the criterion relating to the creation and payment of gov-
ernment debt and industrial earning power as the criterion for com-
mercial debt. But since the war, we have talked a new language—a 
kind of economic jargon. Nothing now seems to us worth noticing 
but the export surplus, failing to possess which, the debtor, we have 
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been told, cannot pay, and succeeding in possessing which he wi l l , 
by paying, bring serious embarrassment or ruin to the industrial l i fe 
of the creditor nation. 
Of such stuff is modern economic theory made. For nearly a 
decade the spectre of the export surplus has dominated the minds 
alike of those who have feared that the debts could not be paid and 
of those who feared that they would be paid. A n economic law has 
been discovered, which though it did not operate at all before the 
war, is now said to operate with remorseless finality. It is a law 
which now runs to the disqualification of France as the principal 
creditor on reparation account and of the United States as the chief 
creditor on inter-ally and commercial loan accounts, but which, in 
pre-war days, when England was creditor on world account in nearly 
twice the amount of the present position of the United States, did 
not run at all. 
Today, Europe and the rest of the world owe us on commercial 
debt about nine billion dollars (net after deducting American obliga-
tions owed to abroad); and on inter-ally debt, about seven billion 
dollars (representing the real present value of the annuities con-
templated by the funding agreements, if capitalized at four per cent). 
The total is 16 billion dollars, the difference in the character of the 
two major components of this indebtedness being immaterial, so far 
as any possible difficulties of transfer are concerned. As against this 
16 billion dollars owed to the United States at the present time, the 
United States and the rest of the world before the war owed Europe 
the equivalent of 50 billion dollars in present day values (our share 
being 7 ½ billions). Thirty billion dollars of this debt was owed 
to England alone and most of the remainder to France and Germany. 
Now what happened in the matter of international debt collection 
in those pre-war years? What happened was that every solvent 
debtor paid his debts without difficulty to himself or anyone else, and 
every English investor who held foreign obligations of good credit 
rating regularly cashed his coupons and duly deposited his collections 
of matured principal in a sterling bank account or any other kind of 
a bank account in which he saw fit to place them. Individually, every 
good debt was collected in cash; the aggregate of the foreign lend-
ings, however, never decreased. It increased steadily, other require-
ments of the industries of debtor countries taking the place of the 
obligations which were paid off. Nothing untoward happened in the 
realm of economic law, and the transfer problem was unheard of. 
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What new factor has, since the war, been introduced into the situ-
ation to change all this? What, if anything, has made the interna-
tional economic system of the past suddenly sinister or unworkable? 
The answer is, of course, nothing at all. A l l that has happened is 
that Country X which was a creditor is now a debtor and Country Y 
which was a debtor is now a creditor. The transfer problem is noth-
ing but a state of mind. When the inter-ally debts were suddenly 
and dramatically created in the amount of 10 billion dollars, 200 or 
300 million people looked at them and gasped, and of that number 
not one-tenth of one percent had ever heard of the 50 billion dollars 
of foreign obligations (33 billions in pre-war values) which Europe 
had held in 1913. A legend of impossibility and danger was then 
and there created, which grew and spread and came to be widely 
accepted by many who have never to this day applied to it the critical 
test of experience and common sense. 
The fact is that international debts normally never have been paid 
by means of an export surplus. International debts arise solely as a 
consequence of the fact that the debtor countries possess no export 
surplus; and over long periods of years they are paid, as they mature, 
by the creation of fresh debt. Nothing could be more natural, more 
healthy or more profitable for all concerned than the working out 
of this cycle of world distribution of capital. And nothing has been 
passed over in more complete silence by that school of Brit ish eco-
nomists who looked at the inter-ally debts and solemnly pronounced 
them impossible. 
The world is divided at any given time into natural debtor coun-
tries and natural creditor countries. A natural debtor country is one 
whose current needs for capital for internal development or recon-
struction exceed its annual savings—thus the United States before 
the war and Europe today. A natural creditor country is one whose 
current needs for capital at home are less than its annual savings-— 
thus Europe before the war and the United States today. And the 
index of these needs lies in interest rates. Capital follows interest 
rates as the tides follow the moon. It is obedient to the law of 
supply and demand; and so today our surplus capital, the product of 
our industries, loaned abroad by our investors, is flowing across the 
Atlantic in a steady stream. 
This movement of the capital of a creditor country, these ship-
ments of its surplus production constitute the only authentic export 
surplus known to the international economic system—the export sur-
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plus which a natural creditor nation inevitably has and which a 
natural debtor nation inevitably has not. The authentic export sur-
plus moves not from but to the debtor nation. Af ter the primary 
exchanges of goods against goods have taken place to the ful l extent 
of the natural debtor country's exports, the secondary movement of 
trade takes place—that significant movement of the export surplus 
of the natural creditor against securities of the natural debtor, profit-
ably employing the excess productive capacity of the creditor and 
building up the deficient capacity of the debtor. In this manner, and 
in this manner only, are international debts (on balance) created, and, 
so long as the debtor remains a natural debtor, are the interest and 
sinking fund charges on them settled. 
For ten years British economists have been dinning into our ears 
that Germany and the allies cannot within a considerable time be ex-
pected to develop an export surplus. This demonstration has been 
a work of supererogation, for it is obvious that Europe's losses cut 
untold billions deep into her productive powers, as measured by plant, 
good will and manpower. But the idea that without an export surplus 
those countries cannot settle their international balances in a wholly 
natural way for an indefinite period has nothing to support it. 
Trade and finance under the modern system and on the modern 
scale came into being in the last century, and throughout that century 
the normal and only method of payment of international debts was 
through refunding, not in detail, but in the aggregate. Never, except 
on the abnormal occasion of a complete world overturn and then only 
for the four years duration of the overturning process were inter-
national debts ever settled through an export surplus. That occasion 
was when, under the stimulus of an unheard of war demand and after 
years of intensive development as a debtor nation, the United States 
took its new position in the world, settled its accumulated balance by 
a huge export of goods to Europe, and created a balance of 10 billion 
dollars on the other side of the account. Normally, international 
capital balances are never finally settled at all, any more than are the 
deposits of the banks or the obligations of the railroads. Once only 
in history has such a settlement of international balances ever taken 
place, and then only at the end of a cycle—the end, so far as we can 
now see, of the cycle of European economic supremacy and the be-
ginning of the cycle of American supremacy. 
The aggregate indebtedness keeps piling up. Individual debts are 
paid, but new ones, on an increasing scale, commensurate with the 
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expansion of population and the natural growth of business, take 
their place. The dollar exchange created by the new loans takes care 
of the old loans and finances new American exports. And so the 
process goes on in this new world job of ours, which England once 
performed. This expansion, the English tell us, is dangerous to the 
United States. But I have yet to hear any sensible reason advanced 
why it is dangerous or why it cannot go on indefinitely to levels 
scarcely yet dreamed of. And , as a practical matter, at the present 
rate of increase, which for the year 1926 was about 700 million dol-
lars, net after offsets for money loaned to us, it will be 50 years be-
fore we arrive at that position which European manufacturers and 
investors held in world trade and finance in 1913. 
It seems to me that on the evidence, we may safely conclude that 
those who have feared that the debts, whether reparation, inter-ally, 
or commercial, cannot be paid because the debtor countries wil l not 
have an export surplus, have been unnecessarily concerned. For, so 
long as the debtor countries have no export surplus, they wil l be in 
the market for new foreign loans, and the debts wil l be paid by the 
new loans. And , when, by the aid of the loans and other natural 
recuperative processes, those countries have built up their produc-
tivity and come to the point of being natural creditor nations, with 
export surpluses of their own, the debts wil l then be paid by means 
of export surpluses. Obviously, a nation must either have an export 
surplus or not have one, and under neither condition has any eco-
nomic law of attainder running against creditors ever yet been passed. 
Wi th the same facts in mind regarding the world ebb and flow 
of surplus capital there is, I think, a brief and relatively simple an-
swer to the apprehensions of those who fear that the debts owing to 
us will some day be collected by means of a European export surplus 
and that our industries wil l be buried under the influx. The picture 
which they draw of a huge increase in our imports brought about by 
the pressure of debts seeking to be paid, is nothing more than a fig-
ment of the imagination. The debts, whether they be big or little 
will be a merely passive factor in the situation. 
If, in the future, we should become a natural debtor country by 
comparison with Europe, that is to say, needing capital more acutely 
than Europe and accordingly offering higher interest return for it, 
that condition wil l not arise for reasons connected with the existence 
of the debts nor wil l its degree be at all proportionate with their size. 
It wil l arise, if it arises at all, from the need of more capital at home 
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and it wil l presumably be satisfied in the first instance by keeping 
our export surplus at home, and after that, if we need still more 
capital, by demanding Europe's surplus. In such circumstances, our 
industries wi l l be crying for capital, they wil l be crying for increased 
productivity, and the resulting import of capital goods, which industry 
itself wil l voluntarily stimulate by offering high interest rates, wil l 
serve the dual purpose of providing new capital and of supplementing 
a shortage of home product. In this process, the debts wil l be col-
lected against the deficiency in our export balances, but they wil l have 
no part in creating that deficiency. When this condition begins to 
run, we shall be collecting the debts by exporting the evidences of debt, 
and, so far as I can see, the only significance which the size of the 
debts wil l have wil l be that the more foreign obligations which we 
hold, the longer wil l it be before we begin to export our own obliga-
tions in settlement of our adverse current balances. 
The sum and substance of the matter, so far as supposed dangers 
of debt collection in goods are concerned, is this: That i f we do in 
the future decrease our exports and increase our imports it wil l be 
for reasons unrelated to the debts and connected solely with the mat-
ter of capital supply and demand, in circumstances which we in the 
past as a debtor nation and Europe in the present as a debtor con-
tinent have found to be thoroughly healthy and stimulating. 
But who is there who thinks that this situation is going to arise 
soon or suddenly? Whether its possibilities relate only to the satis-
faction of natural and complementary demands of the nations con-
cerned, or whether they contain also elements of danger, we may 
safely agree with the economists as to the unlikelihood of Europe's 
soon producing an export surplus. Can we not then for the present 
enjoy at its full artistic value, without indulging in too many an-
ticipatory shivers, their thrilling depiction of what wil l one day 
happen when American industry in the role of Litt le Red Riding 
Hood comes face to face with the ugly fangs of Europe's Export 
Surplus? 
Naturally, by our loans we are building up the productive strength 
of our competitors. But shall we be frightened by our own pros-
perity? If we wish to trade and prosper today we cannot help bene-
fiting Europe by the rich and fertile overflow of our surplus, even 
if we would. A n d if as a nation we would prevent it if we could, 
we should be guilty of the twin stupidities of failing to recognize 
Europe as more of a customer than a competitor and of failing to 
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understand that the healthy activity even of a competitor builds 
wider markets everywhere for all. 
A s for the inter-ally debts, it is too late to consider them at all in 
such a significance. If they conserved Europe's basic productivity 
by helping to preserve Europe's liberties that was all done and com-
pleted a decade ago when the loans were made. And it would be 
ridiculous for us to cancel them for fear of the hobgoblin labelled 
dangers of repayment. It is inconceivable that the American people 
would be willing to place themselves in history as the butts of such 
a colossal hoax. If we decide to reduce the debts further we ought 
to do it on grounds creditable to our intelligence and meriting the 
respect of the world, as an act of human forbearance,. of political 
sagacity and, as I see it, of business sense. I am not here to argue 
revision of the debt settlements, I should like merely to suggest that 
the real outlines of the question have so far been obscured by a fog 
of pseudo economic doctrine. When that is cleared away, we shall 
perhaps be able to consider whether it is worth our while in spiritual 
satisfaction to secure the good wil l of Europe's overburdened tax-
payers, and whether an increase in their purchasing power would be 
profitably reflected in our export trade. 
Whatever our decisions on this and other questions related to the 
subject of international debts we might appropriately celebrate our 
entry into wider fields of world affairs by declaring our independence 
of doctrinaire economics and assinging a somewhat higher value, than 
is now the fashion, to judgments based on experience. 
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